Abstract-This paper provides a systematic estimation of import demand elasticities for a broad group of countries at a very disaggregated level of product detail. We use a semiflexible translog GDP function approach to formally derive import demands and their elasticities, which are estimated with data on prices and endowments. Within a theoretically consistent framework, we use the estimated elasticities to construct Feenstra's (1995) simplification of Anderson and Neary's trade restrictiveness index (TRI). The difference between TRIs and import-weighted tariffs is shown to depend on the tariff variance and the covariance between tariffs and import demand elasticities.
I. Introduction

I
MPORT demand elasticities are crucial inputs into many ex ante analyses of trade reform. To evaluate the impact of regional trade agreements on trade flows or customs revenue, one needs to first answer the question of how trade volumes would adjust. To estimate ad valorem equivalents of quotas or other nontariff barriers one often needs to transform quantity impacts into their price equivalent, for which import elasticities are necessary. Moreover, trade policy is often determined at much higher levels of disaggregation than existing import demand elasticities. 1 This mismatch can lead to serious aggregation biases when calculating the impact of trade policy interventions that have become surgical procedures. Finally, to evaluate trade restrictiveness and welfare loss across different countries and years, one would need to have a consistent set of trade elasticities, estimated using the same data and methodology. These do not exist. The closest substitute, and the one often used by trade economists, is the survey of the empirical literature put together by Stern, Francis, and Schmacher (1976) . More recent attempts to provide disaggregate estimates of import elasticities have been country specific and have mainly focused on the United States. 2 The objective of this paper is threefold. First, to fill in the gap in the literature by providing a systematic estimation of import demand elasticities for a broad range of countries at a fairly disaggregated level of product detail. Second, using the estimated elasticities and within a theoretically consistent framework, we construct measures of trade restrictiveness based on Feenstra's (1995) simplification of Anderson and Neary's trade restrictiveness index (TRI) . 3 The TRI is the uniform tariff that would maintain welfare at its current level given the existing tariff structure. Finally, using TRIs the paper analyzes the size and composition of tariffinduced trade distortions.
The basic theoretical setup for the estimation of import demand elasticities is the production-based GDP function approach as in Kohli (1991) and Harrigan (1997) . This GDP function approach is consistent with neoclassical trade theories, and it takes into account general equilibrium effects associated with the reallocation of resources due to exogenous changes in prices and endowments. As in Sanyal and Jones (1982) , imports are considered inputs into domestic production, for given exogenous world prices, productivity, and endowments. In a world where a significant share of growth in world trade is explained by vertical specialization (Yi, 2003) , the fact that imports are treated as inputs into the GDP function-rather than as final consumption goods as in most of the previous literature-seems an attractive feature of this approach. More importantly, even if an imported good is ready for final consumption, before being sold in the domestic market it will incorporate some domestic value added associated with domestic transport and logistics, marketing, and retailing (see Sanyal & Jones, 1982) . This implies that all imported goods should be treated as inputs into the GDP function.
The estimated import demand elasticities are defined as the percentage change in the quantity of an imported good when the price of this good increases by 1%, holding prices of all other goods, productivity, and endowments of the economy constant. This is in contrast to the more commonly used price elasticities of demand, which are derived from utility maximization or expenditure minimization holding GDP or national income constant. As argued by Kohli (1991) it seems that the former approach is more consistent with neoclassical international trade theories, where income is generally considered endogenous, and endowments and productivity are most of the time exogenous.
While Kohli (1991) focuses mainly on aggregate import demand and export supply functions and Harrigan (1997) on industry-level export supply functions, this paper modifies the GDP function approach to estimate import demand elasticities at the six-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS). When estimating elasticities of the 4,900 goods at tariff line level, dealing with cross price effects can become insurmountable. In order to avoid running out of degrees of freedom in the estimation of the structural parameters of the GDP function, we reparameterize the fully flexible translog function to be semiflexible, or flexible of degree one, as in Diewert and Wales (1988) . This reparameterization significantly reduces the number of price-related translog parameters from N(N Ϫ 1)/ 2 ϩ N (around ten million in our case), to only N (around 4,900), and yet is flexible enough to approximate up to the second order any twice continuously differentiable function at any point. A similar simplification is used in Neary (2004) for the estimation of the AIDS and QUAIDS systems.
Another practical problem we are facing is that the HS classification was only introduced in the late 1980s, so even if we solve the n-good problem, we may still run out of degrees of freedom if we were to estimate the different parameters using only the time variation in the data. Thus, assuming that the structural parameters of the GDP function are common across countries (up to a constant) as in Harrigan (1997) , we take advantage of the panel dimension of the data set by applying within estimators.
Finally, we address econometric issues associated with the potential endogeneity and measurement errors of unit values, selection bias due to zero imports, the sluggish adjustment of imports to changes in prices, and other explanatory variables.
More than 377,000 import demand elasticities have been estimated across 117 countries for 4,900 HS six-digit products. The simple average elasticity across all countries and goods is about Ϫ3.12. The overall fit of the import demand elasticities is good. The median of bootstrap t-statistics is 3.3, and more than 70% of the estimates are statistically significant.
Using the estimated import demand elasticities, we construct TRIs for 88 countries for which tariff schedules are available. We show that the difference between TRI and import-weighted tariff depends on the variance of tariffs and the covariance between tariffs and import demand elasticities. Results suggest that the contribution of the variance of tariffs and their covariance with import demand elasticities to the overall trade restrictiveness of the countries in our sample is high, as import-weighted average tariffs underestimate the restrictiveness of a country's tariff regime by 64% on average. In some countries, such as the United States, TRI is more than three times higher than the importweighted average tariff. This indicates the presence of disproportionately large tariff variance and covariance with import demand elasticities.
Finally, we study the roles of tariffs' variance and covariance with import demand elasticities in determining the size and composition of the deadweight loss associated with the existing tariff schedules of the 88 countries. The results show that omitting the variance of tariffs and their covariance with import elasticities leads to the underestimation of the size of the total deadweight loss by 55%. In other words, the overall deadweight loss due to tariffs is two times higher than average tariffs would imply. Countries that have the largest share of deadweight loss due to tariff variance are Japan, the Philippines, and Egypt. Countries where the covariance between tariffs and import elasticities plays a large role in causing deadweight loss are Sudan, Canada, and the United States. In particular, 64% of the Canadian deadweight loss of $912 million per annum can be attributed to higher tariffs on more elastic imports such as wheat. Given that a high import demand elasticity could be due to close substitution with domestic goods, this result highlights that those industries that lobby for tariff protection are those that face severe import competition-a result that can inform lobbying models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the theoretical framework to estimate import demand elasticities, whereas section III describes the empirical strategy. Section IV discusses data sources. Section V presents the results of the estimation of import demand elasticities. Section VI applies the estimated import demand elasticities to construct TRIs, as well as deadweight losses associated with existing tariff structures and their determinants. Section VII concludes.
II. Theoretical Model-GDP Function Approach
The theoretical model follows Kohli's (1991) GDP function approach for the estimation of trade elasticities. We also draw on Harrigan's (1997) treatment of productivity terms in GDP functions. We will first derive the GDP and import demand functions for one country. However, assuming that the GDP function is common across all countries up to a country-specific term-which controls for country productivity differences-it is then easily generalized to a multicountry setting in the next section.
Consider a small open economy in period t. 4 Let S t ʚ R NϩM be the strictly convex production set in t of its net output vector q t ϭ (q 1 t , q 2 t , . . . , q N t ) and factor endowment vector
For the elements in the net output vector q t , we adopt the convention that positive numbers denote outputs, which include exports, and negative numbers denote inputs, which include imported goods. We consider imported goods and competing domestically produced goods as differentiated products. Similarly, domestic products sold in the domestic market are differentiated from products sold in foreign markets (that is, exported).
Given the exogenous world price vector p t ϭ ( p 1 t , p 2 t , . . . , p N t ) Ͼ 0, the country-specific endowments, v t , and N-dimensional diagonal Hicks-neutral productivity matrix A t ϭ diag{A 1 t , A 2 t , . . . , A N t }, perfect competition leads firms to choose a mix of goods that maximizes GDP in each period t:
where
, is the maximum value of goods the economy can produce given prices, Hicks-neutral productivity, and factor endowments in period t. It is equal to the total value of output for exports and final domestic consumption minus the total value of imports (q n t Ͻ 0 for imports). In other words, the optimal net output vector is chosen to maximize GDP, for given prices, productivity, and endowments. We shall refer to the optimal net output vector as the GDP-maximizing net output vector, which includes GDP-maximizing import demands.
As shown in Harrigan (1997) , equation (2) highlights that price and productivity enter multiplicatively in the GDP function, G t ( p t A t , v t ). This property allows us to reexpress the GDP function, by defining the productivity inclusive price vector,
p t ϵ p t A t , and p n t ϵ p n t A n t , @n.
Notice that the productivity inclusive price vector, p t , is no longer common across countries even though the world price vector, p t , is identical across countries. This allows the model to better fit the data where different world prices are observed for the same good in different countries. In a recent study, Schott (2004) successfully explains variation in unit values within tariff lines with GDP per capita-the higher is GDP per capita, the higher the unit value. To the extent that GDP per capita is a proxy for labor productivity, Schott's finding provides support for our productivity inclusive price level, p t . For G t ( p t , v t ) to be a well-defined GDP function, it is assumed to be homogeneous of degree one with respect to prices. Moreover, strict convexity of S t also ensures that the second-order sufficient conditions are satisfied, such that G t ( p t , v t ) is twice differentiable and it is convex in p t and concave in v t . To derive the import demand function, we apply the Envelope Theorem, which shows that the gradient of G t ( p t , v t ) with respect to p t is the GDP-maximizing net output vector, q t ( p t , v t ): 5
Thus if good n is an imported good, equation (5) is the GDP-maximizing import demand function of good n, which is a function of prices and endowments. It also implies that an increase in import prices would reduce GDP (that is, q n t Ͻ 0 if n is an imported good). Given that G t ( p t , v t ) is continuous and twice differentiable, and is convex and homogeneous of degree one with respect to prices, the Euler Theorem implies that q n t is homogeneous of degree zero in prices, has nonnegative own price effects, and has symmetric cross price effects: 6
In other words, for every final good, including exports, a price increase raises output supply; for every input, including imports, an increase in prices decreases input demand. In addition, if an increase in the price of an imported input causes supply of an exported output to decrease, then an increase in the price of the exported output would increase the demand of the imported input in the same magnitude. Equation (5) shows that the GDP-maximizing import demand function of good n is a function of prices and factor endowments. Thus, the implied own price effects of imports, and the import demand elasticities, are therefore conditioned on prices of other goods and aggregate endowments being fixed. In other words, the GDP-maximizing import demand functions do not depend on income or utility, unlike the expenditure-minimizing Hicksian import demand functions or the utility-maximizing Marshallian import demand functions. This is because aggregate factor income and welfare are in fact endogenous to prices and endowments. Such a setup is more relevant for general equilibrium trade models, but may not be relevant for partial equilibrium micro models which often take aggregate income as exogenous. As a result, comparing the GDPmaximizing import demand elasticities with the existing 5 To ensure that the GDP function is differentiable and the gradient of G t ( p t , v t ) with respect to p t is the net output vector, we assume that there are at least as many factors as goods, M Ն N. If there are more goods than factors, then the output vector is not unique, and the gradients need to be reinterpreted as a set of subgradient vectors (see Harrigan, 1997) . In the empirical section, we have three aggregate factors, which are assumed to be composite factors consistently aggregated from as many disaggregate factors as necessary to satisfy the assumption that there exist more factors than goods. See Kohli (1991) for details. 6 The latter by Young's Theorem.
Hicksian or Marshallian import demand elasticities in the literature may not be appropriate. Note that we will not be able to derive income elasticities from the GDP-maximizing import demand functions, but instead, we would be able to estimate the Rybczynski elasticities from equation (5), which shows how import demand reacts to changes in factor endowments. 7 To implement the above GDP function empirically, we first assume that G t ( p t , v t ) follows a flexible translog functional form with respect to good prices and factor endowments, with n and k index goods, and m and l index factors:
where all the translog parameters a, b, and c are indexed by t to allow for changes over time. As shown in Kohli (1991) and Harrigan (1997) , such a fully flexible translog function can approximate any functional form up to second order without loss of generality. In addition, there are some nice features of the above specification that are absent in the more commonly used CES specification. First, we do not need to assume that the elasticity of substitution between goods is constant. Second, the elasticity of substitution of good i with respect to good j does not need to be equal to the elasticity of substitution of good j with respect to good i. Third, the underlying production function does not need to be weakly separable (Blackorby & Russell, 1981) . 8 To make sure that equation (7) satisfies the homogeneity and symmetry properties of a GDP function, we impose the following restrictions:
Furthermore, if we assume that the GDP function is homogeneous of degree one in factor endowments, then we also need to impose the following restrictions:
@m ϭ 1, . . . , M.
Given the translog functional form and the symmetry and homogeneity restrictions, the derivative of ln G t ( p t , v t ) with respect to ln p n t gives the equilibrium share of good n in GDP at period t:
where s n t is the share of good n in GDP (s n t Ͻ 0 if good n is an input, as in the case of imports). From equation (10) it can be shown that, if good n is an imported good, then the import demand elasticity of good n derived from its GDPmaximizing demand function is 9
Thus we can infer the import demand elasticities once a nn is properly estimated based on equation (10). Note that the size of the import elasticity, ε nn t , depends on the sign of a nn t , which captures the changes in the share of good n in GDP when the price of good n increases by 1%:
The rationale is straightforward. If the share of imports in GDP does not vary with import prices (a nn t ϭ 0), then the implied import demand is unitary elastic such that an increase in import price induces an equi-proportional decrease in import quantities and leaves the value of imports unchanged. If the share of imports in GDP, which is negative by construction, decreases with import price (a nn t Ͻ 0), then the implied import demand is inelastic, so that an increase in import price induces a less than proportionate decrease in import quantities. Finally, if the share of import in GDP increases with import prices (a nn t Ͼ 0), then the implied import demand must be elastic such that an increase in import price induces a more than proportionate decrease in import quantity. 10
III. Empirical Strategy
With data on output shares, unit values, and factor endowments, equation (10) is the basis for the estimation of import elasticities. In principle, we could first estimate the own price effects, a nn t , for every good according to equation (10), and apply equation (11) to derive the implied estimated elasticities, since the own price elasticity is a linear function of own price effects. There are, however, at least three problems with the estimation of the elasticities using equation (10). First, there are more than 4,900 HS six-digit goods traded among countries in any given year. Moreover, there is also a large number of nontraded commodities that compete for scarce factor endowments and contribute to GDP in each country. Thus the number of explanatory variables in equation (10) could easily exhaust our degrees of freedom or introduce serious collinearity problems. Second, even after solving this first problem, we could also run out of degrees of freedom given the short timespan of trade data available at the six-digit HS classification, which was introduced in the late 1980s. Third, there are several econometric issues that may bias our results if they are not addressed. These include the endogeneity and measurement error of unit values, selection bias, and the sluggish adjustment of imports to changes in prices or any of the other explanatory variables. We tackle all these problems in turn.
A. Estimating the N-Good Share Equations
Estimating the own price and cross price effects, a nk t , for each of the 4,900 HS six-digit goods is equivalent to estimating the upper triangle of the N by N second-order substitution matrix. Thus in total there would be N(N Ϫ 1)/ 2 ϩ N parameters to be estimated, which works out to represent more than ten million parameters for each time period t! This is obviously not feasible, even if we restrict all the translog parameters to be time invariant, and the normal system of share equation techniques used in Kohli (1991) or Harrigan (1997) would not have been sufficient. We need a way to legitimately reduce the number of parameters to be estimated and focus on only those that are of interest: in our case, the own price import demand elasticities, and therefore the 4,900 diagonal elements of the substitution matrix.
We adopt a semiflexible functional form developed in Diewert and Wales (1988) specifically designed to handle translog models with a large number of goods. We first restrict all the translog parameters to be time invariant. Next, rather than allowing the substitution matrix of [a nk t ] to have full rank, we restrict it to be of rank one by imposing the following constraints:
where ␥, a n , and a k are constants. Such reparameterization effectively reduces the fully flexible translog function in equation (7) to be flexible of degree one. Diewert and Wales (1988) show that such a semiflexible functional form can still approximate a twice continuously differentiable function at any point up to the second order, even though the matrix of second order partial derivatives with respect to prices is restricted to have rank one instead of the maximum possible rank of N Ϫ 1. 11 They further show that the cost of estimating a semiflexible function, instead of a fully flexible functional form, is that one misses part of the effect of a nn associated with the smallest eigenvalues, but in many situations this cost is small. 12 It could be easily verified that for any good n, the above reparameterization satisfies the homogeneity constraint: a nn ϩ ¥ k n a nk ϭ 0, as well as the symmetry constraint: a nk ϭ a kn . In other words, we approximate the full rank second-order substitution matrix by the product of a column vector, a ϭ [a 1 , . . . , a N ]Ј, and its transpose, and adjust the diagonal elements to satisfy all homogeneity constraints (13):
The resulting share equation for each good n is
ln p k t is a weighted average of the log prices of all non-n goods. Thus with this reparameterization, the share equation of good n depends linearly on the log price of good n relative to an average price of all non-n goods, and the endowments. This significantly reduces the number of variables on the right-hand side from N ϩ M, to 1 ϩ M. 13 We further impose homogeneity constraints on endowments, so mϭ1 M c nm ϭ 0, @n ϭ 1, . . . , N. This reduces the number of right-hand-side variables to only M:
Note that the weights used to construct the average price of all non-n goods are all unknown, so we approximate the average price with the observed Tornqvist price index of all non-n goods, ln p Ϫn , which is the share-weighted average prices of all non-n goods. It is constructed using the GDP deflator net of the price of good n, adjusted by the share of non-n goods,
We therefore assume that the structural parameters of the semiflexible translog GDP function are common across countries (up to a constant) as in Harrigan (1997) . Let â nn denote the consistent estimate of a nn . The consistent estimate of import demand elasticity of good n in country c, ε nnc , is constructed using the average import shares of each country c, s nc , and â nn :
The fixed-effect (FE) estimates of a nn according to equation (17) provide our baseline estimates for ε nnc .
C. Econometric Issues
For equation (17) to provide a consistent estimate of a nn , the regression error needs to be well behaved, and in particular it should not be correlated with relative prices. There are three reasons why this may not be the case in practice. First are the endogeneity and measurement errors in prices-countries may face an upward-sloping supply curve, which cause prices to increase with imports; and unit values may measure prices with errors. Both problems contaminate the regression errors and cause the FE estimate of a nn to be biased. Second is selection bias due to zero imports-some countries in some years may choose not to import, and their decision could be driven by factors that are correlated with relative prices. Third is the partial adjustment of imports-import shares may take more than one year to respond to price changes, which leads to serial correlation in error terms and inconsistency in the FE estimate of a nn . We address each of these issues sequentially. We will also provide bootstrap standard errors for the elasticity estimates, taking into account the estimation errors in â nn and the sampling errors in s nc .
Endogeneity and Measurement Errors. The relative price of good n is likely to be correlated with the regression error in equation (17) . Increases in import demand may increase import prices if countries face upward-sloping supply curves. This may bias the FE estimate of a nn toward 0 and reduce the size of the estimated import elasticities. Moreover, because of data limitation, prices of goods are measured by the unit values of imports. Any measurement errors in unit values would also bias the FE estimate of a nn toward 0. We address these two problems by instrumenting unit values using the simple and inverse-distance weighted averages of the unit values of the rest of the world, as well as the trade-weighted average distance of country c to all the exporting countries of good n. We also instrument for the price of non-n goods in a similar fashion to form the average relative price of the rest of the world. Specifically, the two average relative prices of the rest of the world are constructed as follows (recall that the price of a non-n good is the GDP deflator ln p t net of the price of good n, adjusted by the share of non-n good, ln p Ϫn
, for the simple average 1/͑distance in kilometers between country c and k͒ for the weighted average ͑19͒ , where C is the total number of countries in the sample of good n. Trade-weighted distance is calculated as
with k indices all exporting countries of good n; distance between k and c is measured in kilometers, and w k t is the share of k in world exports of good n in year t. We expect the relative price of good n in the rest of the world to be positively correlated with the relative price of n in c, while it is not necessarily correlated with the share of n in the GDP of c. Similarly, the price of good n in c should increase with the distance between c to any exporting country of good n, while the latter may not be correlated with the share of n in the GDP of c. These three instruments therefore pick up the exogenous relationship between the relative price of good n and the dependent variable, while bypassing measurement error and endogeneity of prices.
We estimate equation (17) with fixed-effect instrumental variable (FEIV) regression. Correcting for endogeneity and measurement error should increase the magnitude of the elasticity estimates, relative to the baseline fixed-effect specification of equation (17).
Selection Bias. For each good n, we rely on a countryyear panel data set to estimate equation (17) . These data sets are not balanced as we don't observe positive import values in all countries and years. Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2007) show that omitting countries with zero or missing import volume in a gravity setup explaining bilateral trade may lead to potentially large selection bias in the event zero or missing imports are systematically driven by some unobserved fixed trade costs that are also correlated with the observed trade barriers. However, they find that their theoretical result has little empirical support, as the change in estimates is negligible after they control for selection bias. Nevertheless, this may be different in our sample.
Given that we cannot construct unit value unless import volume is positive, our sample consists mainly of observations with low unobserved fixed trade costs. When the relative price of good n increases, the share of good n in GDP may not change as much if the unobserved fixed costs remain low. This leads to an upward bias (less negative) of the FEIV estimate of a nn , which will underestimate the magnitude of import demand elasticities.
While country and year fixed effects may help control for part of the unobserved fixed costs that are country and year specific, the part of fixed costs that varies within country or within year will still affect our FEIV estimate of a nn . To control for such selection bias, it is necessary to estimate a selection model to control for the propensity of being an importer. Given that importer status is likely to persist over time and may be country specific, we would need to estimate a selection model in a panel data set with unobserved country effects. Wooldridge (2002) details an estimation strategy to deal with a panel selection model with no endogenous right-hand-side variables. In our case, given that we have an endogenous right-hand-side variable (price of good n), we use a procedure developed in Semykina and Wooldridge (2005) , which is an extension of the textbook treatment of Wooldridge (2002) to allow for instrumental variables.
Specifically, we have the following selection model for the importer status of each country c in each good n (index n is omitted for simplicity):
where I c t denotes the importer status, which equals 1 when country c imports some positive amount of good n in year t. It is determined by a latent variable, Ĩ c t , whose realization depends on the vector of exogenous variables and instruments, z c t , unobserved country effects, c c , and a classical error term, c t . Variables in z c t include ln
t , the average relative prices of good n in the rest of the world, and trade-weighted distance as mentioned above.
Estimating equation (21) with probit in the presence of country fixed effect yields inconsistent estimates because of the incidental parameter problems when the year dimension is shorter than the country dimension. Instead, Semykina and Wooldridge (2005) assume that the unobserved country effect, c c , can be modeled as a linear function of the time averages of the exogenous variables and instruments, z c :
where c is a well-behaved error term. Given that the selection equation is just a reduced-form equation, it is less restrictive to have time varying coefficients:
Thus to test for selection bias in this unbalanced panel data set, we first use the probit model to estimate this equation for each period t:
The inverse Mills ratios, c t ϭ ( t ϩ z c t ␦ t ϩ z c t ), is then constructed from the estimated coefficients of the above period-specific probit regression, where (␣) ϭ (␣)/⌽(␣). c t is consistent under the assumption that unobserved country effects in the selection equation are controlled by the time averages of the exogenous and instrumental variables, z c . We include c t in the FEIV regression as an additional right-hand-side variable. Selection bias cannot be rejected if c t is statistically significant, with serial correlation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors being used for the construction of the t-statistic.
To correct for selection bias when c t is statistically significant in the FEIV regression of equation (17) 
The above pooled 2SLS estimate of a nn is consistent in the presence of selection bias, as well as endogeneity and measurement errors in prices. With only one endogenous variable on the right-hand side, we have three additional instruments to help us identify both the selection equation and the share equation. We will be able to test for the validity of instruments with an overidentifying restriction test. In short, equation (26) replaces country fixed effects with a linear function of the time averages of the exogenous variables and instruments and is estimated with pooled 2SLS. We expect the selection bias corrected elasticity estimates to be larger in magnitude.
Serial Correlation and Partial Adjustment in Import Shares. Equation (26) is correctly specified if import shares respond to changes in prices and endowments within a year. If import shares are sticky, and it takes more than one year to fully adjust to changes in any of the right-hand-side variables, then the error term in equation (26) 
When serial correlation is present, equation (27) is estimated using Arellano and Bover (1995) system GMM estimators, which is Arellano and Bond (1991) difference GMM estimators with a level equation added to the system to improve efficiency. 15 nc t is included whenever selection bias is detected in the FEIV regressions. We will use serial correlation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors with the GMM estimates. We will also be able to test for overidentifying restrictions.
Bootstrap Standard Errors for Elasticity Estimates.
To obtain the bootstrap standard errors of the elasticity estimates, we apply the following procedure.
First, for each good n, we randomly draw fifty values of ä nn from a normal distribution according to our preferred estimate, â nn , and its robust standard error. Note that â nn is a consistent estimator, and it has an asymptotic normal distribution (see Wooldridge, 2002, p. 423) . Thus, by constructing a sample normal distribution base on ä nn , we are able to save computing time to obtain the bootstrap sample of ä nn in a reasonable way. 16 Next, for each good n, we construct a random sample of import shares for each country based on repeated draws from the regression data set. The size of the random sample is identical to the actual data set. Based on this random sample we construct the average share of each country. This procedure is repeated fifty times to construct the fifty average shares, s nc , for each good in each country. Finally, we construct fifty elasticity estimates, ε nnc , using ä nn and s nc according to equation (18) . The standard deviation of the fifty ε nnc is the bootstrap standard error of ε nnc for each good in each country.
IV. Data
The data consist of import values and quantities reported by different countries to the UN Comtrade system at the six-digit level of the HS (around 4,900 products). The HS was introduced in 1988, but a wide use of this classification system only started in the early 1990s. The basic data set consists of an unbalanced panel of imports for 117 countries at the six-digit level of the HS for the period 1988-2001. The number of countries obviously varies across products depending on the presence of import flows and on the availability of trade statistics at the HS level. 17 There are three factor endowments included in the regression: labor, capital stock, and agriculture land. Data on labor force and agriculture land are from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2003) . Data on capital endowments is constructed using the perpetual inventory method based on real investment data in the World Development Indicators.
V. Empirical Results
For our baseline FE estimates, we fit equation (17) for each good using available data from all countries and years. Using the FE estimate for a nn , we construct import demand elasticity according to equation (18). After excluding outliers (elasticity estimates that are more than two standard deviations away from the mean) and observations with positive import demand elasticities (about 5% of the estimates), the average elasticity is Ϫ1.60. However, these FE estimates are likely to be biased because of endogeneity and measurement issues.
To correct for endogeneity and measurement errors in prices, we estimate equation (17) using FEIV regression with the simple and inverse-distance weighted-average price of the rest of world and the trade-weighted distance to exporters as the additional instruments. These instruments are constructed according to equations (19) and (20) . Such correction yields an average elasticity of Ϫ3.23. This is in line with our expectation that endogeneity and measurement errors cause the elasticity estimates to be smaller in magnitude. The overall fit of the regressions is good, with an average partial R 2 on the three excluded instruments equal to 0.17, an average p-value of the first-stage F-statistics on the three excluded instruments equal to 0.09, and the instruments being jointly significant in 75% of the regressions.
To test for selection bias, we first run the probit regressions based on equation (25) for every good in every year. The overall fit of the probit regressions is very good with an average pseudo R 2 of 0.36 and an average (10) 2 of 45.98, which is statistically significant for almost all goods. 18 The 15 This is done using the Stata xtabond2 command. See Roodman (2005) for details. 16 Alternatively, we can resample our data set and reestimate the FE, FEIV, pooled 2SLS, and system GMM regressions fifty times for all 4,900 goods in order to obtain the bootstrap distribution of â nn . This will take several weeks of computing time. 17 The estimation sample did not include tariff lines where the recorded trade value at the six-digit level of the HS was below $50,000. This eliminated less than 0.1% of imports in the sample, and it is necessary in order to avoid biasing our results with economically meaningless imports. 18 According to equation (25), we have two relative endowment variables and three instruments, together with the country averages of these five variables, which are used in place of country fixed effects; we have inverse Mills ratio, nc t , is then constructed for the selected sample with positive import values. We include nc t in the FEIV regressions. The null hypothesis that there is selection bias cannot be rejected if nc t is statistically significant. This occurs in 12% of the regressions. To correct for selection bias, we estimate equation (26) for this subset of goods using pooled 2SLS. With the selection bias correction, the overall average elasticity is Ϫ3.32, which again is in line with our expectation that selection bias causes elasticity estimates to be smaller in magnitude.
Finally, tests for serial correlation based on the regression errors of the FEIV regressions show that almost 40% of the regression errors have serial correlation. 19 For this subset of goods, we allow for partial adjustment in import shares. Two versions of equation (27) are estimated with the system GMM estimators depending on whether selection bias was rejected in the FEIV regressions. For about 30% of goods where there is serial correlation but no selection bias, we exclude nc t from equation (27) . With such correction, the overall average elasticity is Ϫ3.03. Thus, not surprisingly, allowing for partial adjustment significantly reduces the magnitude of the demand elasticity even after taking into account the "long-run" effect of prices on import shares by dividing a nn by 1 Ϫ n (the coefficient in front of the lagged dependent variable). 20 For about 5% of the goods where both selection bias and serial correlation are detected, we estimate equation (27) with nc t as an additional explanatory variable. The overall average elasticity using this final correction is Ϫ3.12. This is our final and preferred estimate of import demand elasticities.
Based on these estimates, we evaluate the validity of the instruments taking into account selection bias and partial adjustment. About 85% of the regressions pass the overidentifying restriction tests, with an average p-value of 0.45. Thus overall the instruments perform reasonably well and the specification of the regression is accepted most of the time.
In summary, we estimate more than 377,000 import demand elasticities. While all these elasticities are robust to endogeneity and measurement errors using instrumental variables, 7% of the estimates are further corrected for selection bias only, 29% are corrected for serial correlation only, and 5% are corrected for both selection bias and serial correlation. The simple average elasticity across all countries and goods is Ϫ3.12 and the standard deviation is 14.05, suggesting quite a bit of variance in the estimates, as shown in the kernel density distribution plot in figure 1 . Table 1 presents the sample moments of the elasticity estimates by country. It also provides the average of industrylevel estimates by country, which were estimated using the same methodology, but with data at the ISIC three-digit industry level. As expected, import demands tend to be less elastic when estimated using more aggregated data. 21 Finally, we construct the bootstrap standard errors of these elasticity estimates, taking into account the estimation uncertainty in â nn , the sampling errors in average shares, and, when applicable, the estimation errors in n , and its covariance with â nn . Most of the import demand elasticities are quite precisely estimated. The median t-statistic is around 3.3. Around 57% of the elasticities are significant at the 1% level; 66% at the 5% level; and 71% at the 10% level.
VI. Calculating TRIs and Deadweight Losses
The estimated import demand elasticities allow us to examine the trade restrictiveness and welfare losses associated with the existing tariff structure in 88 countries for which tariff schedules are available. 22 More importantly, this can be done within a theoretically sound framework. Simple and import-weighted average tariffs have been used in the literature as the conventional measures of trade ten variables on the right-hand side of the probit regression, which explains why the 2 distribution has ten degrees of freedom. 19 To test for AR(1), we follow Wooldridge (2002, p. 275) . We regress the fixed-effect error term on its one-period lag in a pooled OLS starting from period three. We evaluate the coefficient of the lagged error based on the fully robust standard error. Under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation, the fixed-effect error term is negatively correlated. Thus, if the lagged error term is statistically negative, we do not reject the null hypothesis. Conversely, if the lagged error term is statistically positive, then we reject the null hypothesis in favor of serial correlation. 20 Arguably, dividing a nn by (1 Ϫ n ) to measure the long-run effect of relative prices on the import share of good n may be seen as ad hoc. Ideally, to estimate the long-run elasticities, we would need to start with a dynamic theoretical setup that explicitly allows for such mechanisms. This is beyond the scope of the current paper. 21 When we restrict the sample to only those goods that are included in the ISIC three-digit classification, the simple average HS six-digit elasticity is Ϫ2.48, while the average ISIC three-digit elasticity is Ϫ1.10.
22 Data sources for tariff data are United Nations' Comtrade and the Integrated Database of the WTO. In this paper, we abstract from measuring the trade restrictiveness of nontariff barriers, as well as the role of tariff preferences in eroding trade restrictiveness. For an attempt to do so, see Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2006) . restrictiveness. 23 As argued by Anderson and Neary (1994 , 1996 , these have little theoretical foundations. Importweighted averages tend to be downward biased, as for example, they put zero weight on prohibitive tariffs and simple average tariffs put identical weights on tariffs that may have very different economic significance. Anderson and Neary (1994, 1996) propose a trade restrictiveness index (TRI), which has a theoretically sound averaging procedure. TRI is defined as the uniform tariff that yields the same real income, and therefore national welfare, as the existing tariff structure. Deadweight loss measures can also be constructed using TRIs and theoretically consistent estimates of import demand elasticities, which in turn allows for comparisons of welfare distortions associated with each country's tariff structure.
To calculate the TRI, one would ideally need to solve a full-fledged general equilibrium model for the uniform tariff that could keep welfare constant given the observed tariff structure. Taking a partial equilibrium approach, Feenstra (1995) provides a simplification for the calculation of TRI, which only requires information on import demand elasticities, share of imports, and tariff schedules: 24
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with t nc as the tariff on good n in country c. Thus, the partial equilibrium TRI is the square root of a weighted average of square tariffs, where weights are determined by the import demand elasticities in each country. Given that we are using GDP-maximizing import demand elasticities instead of Hicksian elasticities as in Feenstra (1995) , our measures of TRI and DWL are consistent with GDP maximization. 25 It is clear from equation (28) that when tariffs are uniform, the TRI equals both import-weighted and simple average tariffs. When tariffs are not uniform, this is no longer the case, except under very unlikely conditions. To see this, let t c denote the import-weighted average tariff of country c, c 2 the import-weighted variance of the tariff schedule, ε c the import-weighted average elasticities of c, ε nc the import demand elasticity of good n in c rescaled by ε c , and c the import-weighted covariance between tariff square and import demand elasticities:
Then using equation (28) it can be shown that 26
Thus, according to equation (29), TRI increases with importweighted tariffs, their variance and their covariance with import demand elasticities. As in Feenstra (1995) and Anderson and Neary (2007) , everything else equal, the larger the tariff variance, the larger is TRI c relative to t c . More interestingly, TRI c will be larger than t c , if high tariffs are levied on more elastic imported goods so that the covariance between elasticities and tariff squared is positive. In short, the ratio and difference between TRI and t c reflects both the variance of tariffs and the correlation between tariffs and import demand elasticities:
Using equations (28) and (29), one can further compute the linear approximation to the deadweight losses (DWL) associated with the existing tariff structure as
Tariff-elasticity covariance .
Equation (33) shows how we can infer the deadweight loss associated with the existing tariff regime using the constructed TRI c . Equation (34) shows how the deadweight loss can be divided into the three elements that define TRI c . Table 2 presents TRIs computed using equation (28) for a sample of 88 countries where tariff schedules are available 23 If nontariff barrier measures are to be considered, trade economists often use simple or import-weighted coverage ratios of nontariff barriers.
24 See equation (3.5) in Feenstra (1995) . Note that given our setup, the derivation in Feenstra (1995) is equivalent to deriving the TRI that would keep GDP at its maximum level given the existing tariff structure. 25 See Kohli (1991) , equations 18.27 to 18.31. 26 In the third equality note that the expected value of ε nc equals 1 by construction.
in the UNCTAD's TRAINS database. 27 While this is the most complete cross-country database on tariff data, there are some missing data. On average, about 93% of the tariff lines at the HS six-digit level (about 4,900 lines) are available, which covers about 87% of the total import of these countries. After taking into account outliers and observations that violate curvature conditions in the estimation of elasticities (that is, that yield positive import demand elasticities), the calculation of TRIs covers 85% of tariff lines and 87% of the imports of these 88 countries. 28 Bootstrap standard errors of TRIs are also presented in table 2, together with simple and import-weighted average tariffs to facilitate comparisons. 29 All TRIs are very precisely estimated, with a minimum t-statistic of 2.14. Simple t-tests further reveal that in 84 countries, the TRI is statistically greater than the import-weighted average tariff. Among the remaining four countries, there are three with uniform tariffs (Hong Kong, Singapore, and Chile), which explains why TRI equals the import-weighted average tariff. The only country that has a nonuniform tariff schedule and yet the TRI is not statistically different from the import-weighted 28 For the 7% of tariff lines that are missing, which represents 13% of imports, we have elasticity estimates for 5.6% of the products or 12% of the imports. 29 Bootstrap standard errors for TRIs are calculated using the same repeated sampling described in the elasticity section, taking into account estimation errors in elasticity and the sample errors in average import shares. Using the fifty random samples of elasticities for all goods, we construct the fifty TRIs for each country. The standard deviation of the fifty TRIs gives us the bootstrap standard errors. a Numbers in parentheses are bootstrapped standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate that the TRI is greater than import-weighted average tariff by at least 20%, 50%, and 100%, respectively.
average tariff is Uruguay, where the TRI is 13% while the import-weighted average tariff is 12%. On average, the TRI is about 80% higher than the import-weighted tariffs and 57% higher than the simple average tariff in the sample. This implies that import-weighted average tariff underestimates the trade restrictiveness of the sampled countries by 64% on average. The sample mean average tariffs, importweighted tariffs, and TRI are 9.52%, 8.12%, and 13%, respectively. Countries with the highest TRIs include Egypt (53.46%), Ghana (34.26%), India (33.11%), Tunisia (31.37%), and Morocco (29.68%). The lowest TRIs are found in Hong Kong (0%), Singapore (0%), Australia (4.97%), Hungary (5.60%), and New Zealand (5.72%). While TRIs, simple, and import-weighted average tariffs are highly correlatedthe correlation coefficient between TRIs and simple average tariffs is 0.79 and between TRIs and import-weighted tariffs is 0.75-pairwise comparisons yield some interesting results. For example, Egypt has the highest TRI but its average tariff is only 9.62%, which is about 1.5 percentage points higher than the sample average. On the other hand, while Norway's average and import-weighted tariffs are only about one-sixth of that of Chile, Norway's TRI is nearly 60% higher. These examples indicate that tariffs' variance and their covariance with import demand elasticities create an important wedge between TRI and importweighted average tariff in some countries. Table 2 highlights countries where TRI is larger than the import-weighted average tariff by at least 20%, 50%, and 100% with *, **, and ***, respectively. More than 80% of the countries in the sample fall into these three categories. Among the countries where the TRI is at least twice as large as the import-weighted tariffs, Sudan, Turkey, Malaysia, and Saudi also have higher than average TRIs, ranging from 26% to 15%, despite relatively low average tariffs. To illustrate the differences between TRIs and import-weighted average tariffs, figure 2 plots these two for the 88 countries in our sample, along with the 45-degree line. For each country, the distance above the 45-degree line indicates the wedge between TRI and import-weighted tariff as shown in equation (31). Countries that have large differences between TRI and import-weighted tariff are located close to the upper-right corner.
What causes the import-weighted tariff to hugely underestimate TRI for these countries? Equation (29) indicates that tariffs' variance and their (positive) covariance with import demand elasticities are the two forces behind this difference. To assess the role played by the former, table 2 also provides the import-weighted variance of tariffs and their import-weighted covariance with import demand elasticities. For most countries in the sample, tariff variance is the major driving force behind the spread between TRI and import-weighted tariffs. However, disproportionately large positive covariances are observed in Sudan, Canada, and the United States, among other countries. In fact 80% of the sample countries have positive covariances between tariffs and import demand elasticities.
The relative contribution of the tariff average, variance, and covariance in distorting trade is most clear when we use TRI to construct and divide total DWL into its three components, according to equation (34). The total DWL and its components in millions of U.S. dollars are presented in table 3. Bootstrap standard errors of the DWL estimates are also presented in this table. The DWL estimates of 78 countries are statistically significant. In terms of total DWL, the United States, China, and Mexico have the largest losses associated with their existing tariff structure. On the other hand, relative to the size of the economy, Egypt, Ghana, and Tunisia face the largest losses, which are 2% to 3% of their GDP.
The division of DWL into its three components shows that average tariffs can explain more than 86% of total DWL in Chile, Uruguay, and Bolivia. These countries have relatively small tariff variance and covariance with import demand elasticities and thus are located very close to the 45-degree line in figure 2. Countries where the variance of tariffs is the largest element contributing to the overall DWL include Japan, the Philippines, and Egypt. More than 90% of the total DWL can be attributed to the variance of tariffs in these countries.
The last component of DWL is the covariance between tariffs and import demand elasticities. Covariance between tariffs and import demand elasticities lowers DWL when negative, and rises DWL when positive. As shown in table 2, seventeen countries in the sample have negative covariance between tariffs and import demand elasticities, indicating that higher tariffs are levied on more inelastic imports. This happens in countries such as Japan, Uruguay, and the Philippines, which have a negative covariance between tariffs and elasticities which lowers their DWL by 15% to 30%. However, for the rest of the countries, positive .5 Import-weighted Tariff covariances between tariff and import demand elasticities not only create the wedge between TRIs and importweighted average tariff, they also increase the size of DWL. This is most important in Sudan, Canada, and the United States, where more than 60% of the DWL is due to the positive covariance between tariffs and import demand elasticities. In particular, in Canada, the covariance between tariffs and elasticities contributes $582 million in DWL, which is nearly two-thirds of its total DWL. A closer look into the Canadian tariff schedule reveals that the highest tariffs, which are 50% and 76%, are levied on wheat (HS 100190 and HS 100110), which has very elastic import demand in Canada because of the close substitution with the vast production of domestic wheat. Given that imports that are close substitutes with domestic products tend to have higher import demand elasticities, the positive covariance between tariffs and import elasticities could be explained by the fact that incentives to lobby for tariff protection are higher when facing stronger import competition.
Finally, some words of caution regarding the TRI and deadweight loss calculations. First, Feenstra's (1995) simplification of Anderson and Neary's TRI only takes into account the direct own price effects of tariffs. It ignores the cross price effects of other tariffs on import demand as well as income effects due to the redistribution of tariff revenue. Thus, it reflects the first-order impact of tariffs on welfare. 30 30 The main difference between this partial equilibrium TRI and the general equilibrium TRI is that cross price effects and income effects stemming from the redistribution of tariff revenue are missing. While a Calculation based on TRI and the estimated import demand elasticities. DWL can be divided into three components associated with the contributions of import-weighted tariff, tariff variance, and the covariance between tariffs and import demand elasticities. A positive contribution of the covariance indicates that countries impose higher tariffs on more elastic imports. Numbers in parentheses are bootstrapped standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate that the DWL is statistically different from 0 with 90%, 95%, and 99% significance, respectively. Second, the calculations of TRI and DWL ignore the existence of nontariff barriers, such as quotas. To the extent that nontariff barriers are the more binding constraints, TRI and DWL presented here may only capture a lower-bound estimate of trade protection and welfare distortions. Third, we have only focused on most favored nations' tariffs, ignoring the numerous preferential agreements that may erode trade restrictiveness. Finally, given the static nature of the analysis, dynamic effects of tariffs on welfare are also ignored.
VII. Concluding Remarks
This paper provides a more systematic estimation of import demand price elasticities than those existing in the previous literature for a broad group of countries and at a fairly disaggregated level of product detail. We use a GDP function approach that is consistent with neoclassical trade theories to derive import demand functions and elasticities. Import demand depends on prices of domestic and imported goods, as well as factor endowments, and can be estimated with existing data sets. The overall fit of the estimation of import demand elasticities is good. The sample average import demand elasticity is Ϫ3.12, with wide variation across countries and products.
We use the elasticity estimates to study the trade restrictiveness and the size and composition of trade distortions in 88 countries for which tariff schedules are available. Instead of relying on simple average or import-weighted tariffs, we construct Feenstra's (1995) simplification of Anderson and Neary's TRI. A major obstacle in the past to calculate the TRI for a wide range of countries was the absence of consistently estimated import demand elasticities. Our estimates overcome this problem.
We then show that the TRI, and the deadweight loss associated with the existing trade regime, can be divided into three elements: the import-weighted average tariff, the tariff variance, and the covariance between tariffs and import demand elasticities. Both a large tariff variance and a high covariance between tariffs and elasticities can drive a large wedge between TRI and the import-weighted tariff, causing the latter to underestimate the restrictiveness of tariff regimes and the deadweight losses associated with them.
Results suggest that import-weighted tariffs underestimate the restrictiveness of trade by 64% on average. While the variance of tariffs explains most of the trade distortions in Japan, the Philippines, and Egypt, the covariance between tariffs and import demand elasticities explains more than 60% of the trade distortions in Sudan, Canada, and the United States. In the case of Canada, about two-thirds of the deadweight loss is due to high tariffs levied on more elastic imported goods. Given that high import demand elasticities partly signal close substitution between domestically produced and imported goods, this result may be explained by the fact that industries that face stronger import competition are more likely to get organized and lobby for tariffs. This empirical observation may help inform the design of lobbying models.
ignoring cross price effects has an ambiguous effect on TRIs, ignoring tariff revenue will unambiguously decrease TRIs. This is because without tariff revenue the welfare of the representative consumer is lower as total disposable income falls. To keep the consumer indifferent, the average tariff will need to decline. Indeed, when we remove tariff revenue from the CGE model of Anderson and Neary (2003) , the average TRI of the countries drops from 17.5% to 11.9%. Nevertheless, the TRI without tariff revenue redistribution is highly correlated with the TRI with tariff revenue redistribution, with a correlation coefficient equal to 0.845.
